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Article text:  
 
Public debate on the economic and financial situation in Greece has intensified in 
recent weeks, writes Cormac Mac Amhlaigh. He remarks on the Eurozone’s difficulty 
in agreeing a third programme for Greece and he outlines potential reforms to the 
governance of the Eurozone to ensure the sustainability of the single currency. 
 
Greece is obviously at the forefront of many EU scholars’ minds over the past 
number of weeks. There has been an avalanche of commentary and analysis on the 
Greek bailout negotiations both from those with intimate knowledge of the 
situation and familiarity with Greek politics, the EMU and sovereign debt crises as 
well speculation from the sidelines from those of us more ignorant of these 
matters. Therefore as someone whose credibility in the debate (such as it is) is 
limited to the expertise of the constitutional lawyer with a good familiarity of EU 
law generally, I have limited my two (euro)cents on the topic to a number of 
(mostly factual) propositions related to the crisis for what they are worth. Most I 
think are obvious and (hopefully) few are contentious, but I think that they are 
worth (re)stating in the context of the war of words and recrimination from all sides 
present in the debate in recent days. 
 
 Greece went bust. The fallout from this was never going to be pretty. There 
were going to be losers, including losers in Greek society, whatever 
happened. 
 
 Debt relief in some shape or form has been part of Troika negotiations at 
least since 2012. This includes, significantly from the viewpoint of 
commentary in some media, debt relief on money owed to private investors 
who took a significant ‘haircut’ on their investments in 2012 as well as other 
means of extending Greece’s loans and lowering interest rates to lighten the 
debt burden. I will not comment as to whether debt relief should have been 
more prominent in negotiations now or before or whether private investors 
should/could have lost more on their investment other than to say that at 
least some private creditors should be counted amongst the losers of the 
crisis. 
 
 
Article No 11  
  
European Futures | Article No 11                                                                          Page 2 of 3 
Article No 11  
 Losers generally complain and protest – it doesn’t mean that they have been 
dealt with unjustly. I will not comment on whether the actual losers in the 
Greek crisis were the ‘right' losers and/or whether they have been treated 
unfairly. 
 
 There is a strong case for a moral duty for all involved to mitigate the effects 
of Greece’s bankruptcy on the most vulnerable in Greek society. I will not 
comment on whether this was actually achieved or could have been achieved 
more effectively. 
 
 Greece is a first world country.  Even within the Eurozone, there are poorer 
countries and more vulnerable people than Greece/Greeks, not to mention 
globally. 
 
 The Eurozone is not a (federal) state. 
 
 No country (or at least no pre-1995 accession country) was forced to join the 
euro. Even if we accept the argument that Eurozone membership benefits 
one or one group of Member States more than others – and is not entirely 
clear that it does – each EU Member state has to take responsibility for 
bringing its country into the Eurozone. 
 
 There are 19 democracies in the Eurozone.  It is arguable that this is perhaps 
too many. As the Eurozone negotiations revealed, what was possible in 
negotiating Greece’s latest package was contingent upon whether Eurozone 
representatives had/could gain the support of national MPs in national 
governments and/or national public opinion. This arguably made the bailout 
negotiations much more complex and acrimonious than they might 
otherwise have been. 
 
 It is a truism that the Eurozone was badly designed, although this may not 
have become so apparent so quickly had the global financial crisis not 
happened when it did.   What this debacle has taught us is that the euro 
cannot live on rules alone.  We have known this for some time ever since 
Eurozone states, including Germany(!), started to breach the rules of 
the Stability and Growth Pact. Therefore further and deeper reforms to 
Eurozone governance are necessary and should be inevitable beyond drafting 
and attempting to enforce new fiscal disciplinary rules. There are many 
possible reforms. Here are three: 
 
 Establish a new permanent mechanism to offset the inability of individual 
Eurozone economies to deal with major shocks due to their loss of monetary 
and fiscal sovereignty through some sort of fiscal transfer fund or otherwise. 
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The ESM operates too much like an international organisation like the 
IMF, involving conditionality and Memoranda of Understanding. This model 
is unsuited to the more integrated condition of Eurozone states. 
 
 Establish independent EU financing through EU taxation to finance this fund. 
 
 Make the Eurozone accountable to one democracy rather than 19 – such as 
the European Parliament so that EU taxpayers, as represented through the 
European Parliament, rather than national taxpayers, represented 
in national parliaments, shoulder the burden of bailouts (but only where 
absolutely necessary). 
 
These proposals will require a(n) (even) greater sense of solidarity between 
Eurozone states than has been displayed since the Eurocrisis began. However, it will 
need to be found, and quickly, if the euro is to survive. 
 
This article was originally published on the Verfassungsblog. 
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